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Abstract
As the scarce spectrum resource is becoming over-crowded, cognitive radios (CRs) indicate great
flexibility to improve the spectrum efficiency by opportunistically accessing the authorized frequency
bands. One of the critical challenges for operating such radios in a network is how to efficiently
allocate transmission powers and frequency resource among the secondary users (SUs) while satisfying
the quality-of-service (QoS) constraints of the primary users (PUs). In this paper, we focus on the
non-cooperative power allocation problem in cognitive wireless mesh networks (CogMesh) formed
by a number of clusters with the consideration of energy efficiency. Due to the SUs’ selfish and
spontaneous properties, the problem is modeled as a stochastic learning process. We first extend the
single-agent Q-learning to a multi-user context, and then propose a conjecture based multi-agent Q-
learning algorithm to achieve the optimal transmission strategies with only private and incomplete
information. An intelligent SU performs Q-function updates based on the conjecture over the other
SUs’ stochastic behaviors. This learning algorithm provably converges given certain restrictions that
arise during learning procedure. Simulation experiments are used to verify the performance of our
algorithm and demonstrate its effectiveness of improving the energy efficiency.
Index Terms
cognitive radio, cognitive wireless mesh networks, dynamic spectrum access, power allocation,
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I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless communications, the electromagnetic radio frequency is the most precious re-
source, the use of which is regulated by governmental agencies on a long-term basis for large
geographical regions. Currently, the frequency band is overcrowded and there hardly exists space
available for the emerging wireless services. However, on the other hand, we are increasingly
beginning to see that the fixed spectrum allocation policy has resulted in vastly under-utilized
spectrum holes. In November 2002, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) published
a report which shows up to 70% of the allocated spectrum in certain measurement geographical
areas in the United States are idle in most of the time [17]. The limited available spectrum and
the inefficiency in the spectrum usage necessitate a new communication paradigm to exploit the
existing wireless spectrum opportunistically [1]. New approaches such as opportunistic spectrum
access (OSA) and dynamic spectrum access (DSA) are proposed to bridge the enormous gulf in
time and space between the regulation and the potential spectrum efficiency. CR is a promising
radio technique possessing intrinsic capability to exploit these spectrum holes by sensing a
wide range of the frequency bands and identifying currently unused spectrum blocks, and then
communicating by an opportunistically overlaying manner [9], [16].
Up to now, the research on CR has already penetrated into different types of wireless networks,
and covered almost every aspect of wireless communications [2], [12], [19], [22], [25]. In this
paper, we focus our emphasis on the cognitive wireless mesh networking scenario, named as
CogMesh as described in our previous work [2]. One of the critical challenges in deploying
CogMesh is how to design an efficient power allocation scheme for the usage of detected available
’spectrum holes’ among the SUs while achieving interference-tolerable spectrum sharing with
the neighboring PUs. An efficient design is to maximize the network performance subject to
guaranteeing the PU transmissions and the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the
SUs’ ongoing connections. The transmission power is a ’double-blade’ sword. On one hand,
the higher the transmission power, the better performance a SU can expect; on the other hand,
this better performance is obtained at the expense of not only causing higher interference to
both the PUs and the other SUs, but also increasing power consumption. In wireless networks,
the choice of transmission power fundamentally affects the performance of multiple protocol
3layers. Recently, there has been much work on formulating the power allocation problem with
cross layer design. The interested reader is referred to [10] and cited references therein. But they
assume that the users are cooperative. Thus, the cross layer design problem can be converted
to the systems optimal design. In our considered CogMesh scenario, cooperation among the
neighboring clusters helps to quantify the tradeoff, for example if a central entity controls the
signaling in the network, it can update and broadcast the relevant information to all clusters and
their registered SUs.
However, it’s more suitable to address the power allocation of CogMesh within a non-cooperative
game-theoretic framework, since there are conflicting interests among the clusters. [6] considered
non-cooperative energy efficient spectrum access for a wireless CR ad hoc network by combining
an unconstrained optimization method with a constrained partitioning procedure. [25] studied the
distributed multi-channel power allocation for CR networks with strategy space to address both
the co-channel interference among SUs and the interference temperature regulation imposed by
PUs. In [22], Fan et al. proposed a price based spectrum management scheme for CR networks.
Assuming that SUs repeatedly negotiating their best transmission powers and spectrum, SUs
announce prices to reflect their sensitivities to the current interference levels, and then adjust
their transmission powers. Our work originates from this non-cooperative problem, whereas we
propose a reinforcement learning algorithm in this paper to deal with it.
In order to formulate the non-cooperative game theoretically, we first model the self-interest
property of power allocation in CogMesh. Generally, the concept of reward refers to the level of
satisfaction the decision-maker receives as a return of its performed action. We construct a reward
function with the consideration of energy-efficiency. Based on the reward function, we model
the selfish behaviors as a non-cooperative power allocation game, that is, each SU maximizes its
own reward, regardless of what all the other SUs do. In spite of this selfish nature, it is significant
for the SUs to adapt to the environment changes since energy efficiency is highly dependent on
environmental factors like primary users’ behavior patterns and traffic QoS requirement.
Therefore, we formulate the power allocation in CogMesh as a stochastic learning process [4],
[11], [20], [26] featured by non-cooperative game playing among the local clusters, in which
the SUs are spontaneous rational players with advanced learning capability; but the SUs may
be selfish at some extent. Then we adopt the framework of reinforcement learning known as
Q-learning [20] in this paper. As illustrated in Fig. 1, during the learning procedure, the SU
4updates its strategy according to its experience with different actions without explicit modeling
of the environment. Based on the single-agent Q-learning algorithm, a multi-agent Q-learning
is proposed to accomplish the problem of multi-user stochastic learning. One challenge of the
proposed approach to our scenario is that the SUs do not know the information of other SUs
due to the non-cooperation among clusters. Then the networking environment is non-stationary
for all SUs and the convergence of learning process may not be assured. To alleviate the lack
of mutual information exchange, the SUs form internal conjectures over how the other SUs
react to their present actions with only local observations from direct interactions with the
CogMesh environment. Learning is finished asymptotically by appropriately making the use of
past experience. Essentially, our argument is that every rational SU has the motivation to improve
its performance even if they are selfish by nature.
Some work about reinforcement learning in CR networks have been investigated [3], [14],
where the studies are focused on the channel allocation, which is different from the topic in
this paper. Our work is the first one toward exploring the multi-agent Q-learning theory in
the stochastic non-cooperative power allocation game in CR networks, especially, CogMesh.
Compared to the previous work, this work provides the following three key insights:
• Firstly, for the non-cooperative power allocation game in CogMesh, we show that the selfish
dynamics exist in the stochastic learning process.
• Secondly, we present a reinforcement learning algorithm where the update rule is based on
SU’s own private and incomplete information; the selfish learning dynamics converge.
• Thirdly, this paper also contributes to the general literature on multi-agent Q-learning.
While traditional multi-agent Q-learning algorithms, such as Nash-Q [11] and CE-Q [8] in
computer science (CS), rely on the full information of all agents in the environment. This is
impossible in the scenarios of wireless communication, since there exist conflicting interests
among the users. Thereupon, we developed a conjecture-based multi-agent Q-learning.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly introduce the
single-agent Q-learning algorithm and its extension to multi-agent scenarios. In Section III,
we formulate the non-cooperative power allocation problem as a stochastic learning game, for
which we also present the design objective and the relevant challenging issues. In Section IV,
we propose a conjecture-based multi-agent Q-learning algorithm; and the convergence of the
5proposed algorithm is further investigated. The numerical results are included in Section V,
verifying the validity and efficiency of the proposed algorithm. Finally, we present in Section
VI a conclusion of this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES OF Q-LEARNING ALGORITHM
In this section we first give a brief introduction on the single-agent Q-learning algorithm, and
then extend the algorithm to multi-agent scenarios. Our description adopts standard notations
and terminologies from the framework of reinforcement learning [7], [11], [20].
A. Single-agent Q-learning
The environment, which an agent interacts with, is typically formulated as a finite-state Markov
Decision Process (MDP). Let S be a discrete set of environment states, and A a discrete set of
actions. At each step t, the agent senses the state st = s ∈ S and selects an action at = a ∈ A
to perform. As a result, the environment makes a transition to the new state st+1 = s′ ∈ S
according to probability Tss′(a) and thereby generates a feedback (reward) rt = r(st, a) ∈ R
passing to the agent. This process is repeated infinitely.
The task of the agent is then to learn an optimal policy π∗(s) for each s, which maximizes
the total expected discounted reward over an infinite steps.
V pi(s) = E
[
∞∑
t=0
βtr(st, π(st))|s0 = s0
]
, (1)
where s0 is the initial state, E means the expectation operator and β ∈ [0, 1) is the discount
factor. We can rewrite Equation (1) as [20]
V pi(s) = E[r(s, π(s))] + β
∑
s′∈S
Tss′(π(s))V
pi(s′).
It has been proven that the optimal policy satisfies the Bellman optimality equation
V ∗(s) = V pi
∗
(s) = max
a∈A
{
E[r(s, a)] + β
∑
s′∈S
Tss′(a)V
∗(s′)
}
. (2)
One of the attractiveness of Q-learning is that it assumes no a prior knowledge about the state
transition probabilities Tss′(a). We define the right-hand side of Equation (2) by,
Q∗(s, a) = Qpi
∗
(s, a) = E[r(s, a)] + β
∑
s′∈S
Tss′(a)V
pi∗(s′). (3)
6Then by Equation (2),
V ∗(s) = max
a∈A
Q∗(s, a).
The optimal state value function V ∗(s) can be hence obtained from Q∗(s, a). And in turn,
Equation (3) may be expressed as
Q∗(s, a) = E[r(s, a)] + β
∑
s′∈S
{
Tss′(a)
[
max
b∈A
Q∗(s′, b)
]}
.
In Q-learning, the agent tries to find Q∗(s, a) in a recursive way with the information 〈s, a, rt, s′〉.
The updating rule is
Qt+1(s, a) = (1− αt)Q
t(s, a) + αt
[
rt + βmax
b
Qt(s′, b)
]
,
where αt ∈ [0, 1) is the learning rate. Assuming that each action is executed in each state an
infinite number of times and the learning rate αt is decayed appropriately in a suitable way, the
Qt(s, a) will finally converge to Q∗(s, a) with probability (w.p.) 1 as t→∞ [23].
B. Multi-agent Q-learning
Consider an N-agent game, each agent is equipped with a standard Q-learning algorithm and
learns without any cooperation with the other agents. The received rewards and state transitions,
however, depend on the joint actions of all agents. Let Si be a discrete set of environment
states and Ai a discrete set of actions relevant to agent i. At each step t, the agent senses the
environment state sti = si ∈ Si, then independently chooses action ai ∈ Ai. Consequently, agent
i receives rti = ri(sti, a1, · · ·, aN) and the environment transits to a new state st+1i = s′i ∈ Si
according to the fixed probabilities Tsis′i(a1, · · ·, aN). Note that r
t
i and Tsis′i are defined over the
joint actions (a1, · · ·, aN).
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we consider a non-cooperative power allocation system in which each SU
behaving as a learning agent adjusts its transmission power level based on some reward received
from the self-interested CogMesh environment to arrive at the optimal strategy. The key com-
ponent for describing the selfish interest is the reward function. In this section, we first present
a reward model for the power allocation, which takes the energy-efficiency into account. Based
on the reward model, we formalize the power allocation problem through the non-cooperative
7game playing. Following that, we convert the non-cooperative playing into a stochastic learning
process. Finally, we discuss the design objective and highlight the challenging issues.
A. Reward Function and Non-cooperative Power Allocation Game
We consider a generalized CogMesh networking example consisting of several specific PU
links (i.e., primary transmitter PT and primary receiver PR) and one CR network formed by
a set N = {1, · · ·, N} of SU links spatially distributed in non-overlapping clusters (see Fig.
2). Due to opportunistic spectrum accessing, they coexist in the same area and share the same
frequency band with bandwidth W simultaneously. We assume that each user operates in a
half-duplex manner, which means it cannot receive any signal when it’s transmitting, and vice
versa. The total interference plus noise measured by any SU includes PU-to-SU interference,
SU-to-SU interference, and the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN). A SU suggests a CR
link consisting of a pair of CR nodes, and we use a SU and a CR link interchangeably.
We designate the transmission power and Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) for
SU i by pi(pmini ≤ pi ≤ pmaxi ) and γi, respectively. The other SUs’ transmit power vector is
denoted by p−i = (p1, · · ·, pi−1, pi+1, · · ·, pN). Assume that the channel gains evolve slowly with
respect to the SINR evolution, the SINR of the SU i in this problem formulation is given by
γi(pi, p−i) =
hiipi
σ + φPUi +
∑
j∈N\i
hjipj
,
where hji is the channel gain between the transmitter of SU link j and the receiver of SU link i,
φPUi denotes the PU-to-SU interference at the receiver of SU link i, and σ is the AWGN power.
The goal of power allocation within the CogMesh framework is to ensure that no SU’s SINR
falls below its threshold γ∗i chosen to guarantee adequate QoS, i.e.,
γi ≥ γ
∗
i , ∀i ∈ N .
Furthermore, the opportunistic spectrum access enables the SUs to transmit with overlapping
spectrum and coverage with PUs, as long as that the performance degradation induced on the
PUs is tolerable. In this paper, we consider the following power mask constraint as in [22], that
is, the transmission power level of SU i over the detected frequency band is constrained by
pi ≤ pmask, ∀i ∈ N , (4)
8where pmask is the power mask and is given as a priori. Such a hardware based power mask
is easier to manipulate at the design stage from a practical point of view. This is because the
number of active SUs that share the same spectrum with the PUs varies in time and space, it is
impossible to design the device to account for a ’neighbor-dependent’ power mask especially in
the non-cooperative CogMesh networking.
To implement non-cooperative power allocation in CogMesh, one of the most important
concern is the definition of the received reward. As mentioned above, a higher SINR at the
receiver will generally result in a lower bit error rate and hence a higher throughput. However,
achieving a high SINR requires the SU to transmit at a high power level, which in turn causes
more power consumption as well as increases the magnitude of the interference for other users,
especially the PUs. Accordingly, we choose the average amount of bits received correctly per
unit of energy consumption as the reward function to quantify the tradeoff (as in [15]), as this
brings practical and meaningful metric to define the energy efficiency,
Ri(pi, p−i) =
W log2
(
1 + γi(pi, p−i)/Γ
)
pi
.
Here, Γ is the gap between un-coded M-QAM and the capacity, minus the coding gain. And we
assume that CR transmitters use variable-rate M-QAM, with a bounded probability of symbol
error and trellis coding with a nominal coding gain.
Considering the power mask constraint (4), meanwhile the maximum transmission power
level pmaxi , the action set of SU i is then Pi = [pmini , pmaxi ], where pmaxi = min(pmaxi , pmask).
We formulate the SUs’ selfish behaviors with the theory of non-cooperative game defined by a
tuple G = 〈N ,P, {Ri(·)}〉, where P = P1 × · · · ×PN is the action space available for all SUs.
Formally, the non-cooperative power allocation game in CogMesh can be defined by
max
pi∈Pi
Ri(pi, p−i)
s.t. γi ≥ γ∗i ,
for all i ∈ N . The solution of this game can be derived in the sense of Nash Equilibrium (NE)
[5].
Definition 1: A transmission power vector (p∗1, , p∗−i) is an NE if, for each SU i,
Ri(p
∗
i , p∗−i) ≥ Ri(pi, p∗−i), for all pi ∈ Pi.
9The following proposition shows the sufficient condition for the existence of an NE in the game
[18].
Proposition 1: For any given pmask value, there is an NE in game G if, for i = 1, · · ·, N :
1) The action set Pi is a closed and bounded convex set.
2) The reward function Ri(pi, p−i) is continuous in (pi, p−i) and quasi-concave in pi.
B. Stochastic Power Allocation by Multi-agent Q-learning
The wireless communication system can be considered as a discrete-time system. In this
section, we model the SUs’ selfish behaviors within stochastic game framework, in which every
SU plays the role as an intelligent agent. To be compatible with the multi-agent Q-learning
framework, we first discrete the continuous action profile Pi =
[
pmini , p
max
i
]
as the following
pi(ai) =
(
1−
ai
mi
)
pmini +
ai
mi
pmaxi , a
t
i = 0, · · ·, mi.
We designate ai ∈ Ai = {0, · · ·, mi} as the SU i’s action. Then, it’s necessary to identify the
environment state, the associated reward and the next state.
1) State: Since there is no cooperation among the SUs, the state should be defined based on
the local observation of the environment. At time slot t, we can express the state sti observed
by the SU i as
sti = (i, Ii, pi(ai))t .
Herein, Ii ∈ {0, 1} specifies whether the SU i’s SINR γi at the corresponding receiver end is
above or below its threshold γ∗i . That is,
Ii =
 1, if γi ≥ γ
∗
i ;
0, otherwise.
2) Reward: The reward Ri(si, ai, a−i) = Ri(ai, a−i) of SU i in state si is the immediate
return due to the execution of action ai when all the other SUs choose actions a−i = (a1, · ·
·, ai−1, ai+1, · · ·, aN). Specifically, it is a return of choosing power level pi(ai) in state si to
ensure the transmission QoS requirement as well as to achieve the power efficiency.
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3) Next State: According to the definition of state sti defined in 1), we can see that the state
transition from sti to st+1i is determined by the stochastic power allocations of all SUs.
Thus the non-cooperative game G is converted to the discrete form G ′ = 〈N , {Ai}, {Ri}〉,
i.e., each SU chooses the strategy πi(si) independently to maximize its total expected discounted
reward
max
pii∈Πi
{
E
[
∞∑
t=0
βtRi
(
sti, πi(s
t
i),pi−i(s
t
i)
) ∣∣∣s0i = si
]}
, ∀i ∈ N ,
where pi−i (sti) =
(
π1(s
t
1), · · ·, πi−1(s
t
i−1), πi+1(s
t
i+1), · · ·, πN(s
t
N )
)
and Πi is the set of strategies
available to SU i. A strategy πi of SU i in state si is defined to be a probability vector πi(si) =
[πi(si, 0), · · ·, πi(si, mi)], where πi(si, ai) means the probability with which the SU i chooses
action ai when in state si. For the case of completely exact information about the other SUs’
strategies pi−i = (π1, · · ·, πi−1, πi+1, · · ·, πN), we define the total expected discounted reward of
SU i over an infinite time slots as
Vi(si, πi,pi−i)
= E
[
∞∑
t=0
βtRi
(
sti, πi(s
t
i),pi−i(s
t
i)
) ∣∣∣s0i = si
]
= E [Ri (si, πi(si),pi−i(si))] + β
∑
s′
i
Tsis′i(πi(si),pi−i(si))Vi (s
′
i, πi,pi−i) ,
where Tsis′i(·) is the state transition probability, and
E [Ri(si, πi(si),pi−i(si))] =
∑
a1∈A1
· · ·
∑
aN∈AN
[
Ri(ai, a−i)
N∏
j=1
πj(sj, aj)
]
.
In the stochastic power allocation game, each SU behaves as an learning agent whose task is to
learn the optimal strategy π∗i (si)(i = 1, · · ·, N) for each state si. Let pi∗−i = (π∗1, · · ·, π∗i−1, π∗i+1, · ·
·, π∗N).
Definition 2: A tuple of N strategies (π∗i ,pi∗−i) is an NE if, for each SU i,
Vi(si, π
∗
i ,pi
∗
−i) ≥ Vi(si, πi,pi
∗
−i), for all πi ∈ Πi.
Every finite strategic-form game has a mixed strategy equilibrium [5], that is, there always
exists an NE in our game formulation of stochastic power allocation. The optimal strategy
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satisfies the Bellman optimality equation, that is, for secondary user i
Vi(si, π
∗
i ,pi
∗
−i)
= max
ai∈Ai
E [Ri (si, ai,pi∗−i(si))]+ β∑
s′
i
Tsis′i
(
ai,pi
∗
−i(si)
)
Vi
(
s′i, π
∗
i ,pi
∗
−i
) , (5)
where
E
[
Ri
(
si, ai,pi
∗
−i(si)
)]
=
∑
a1∈A1
· · ·
∑
ai−1∈Ai−1
∑
ai+1∈Ai+1
· · ·
∑
aN∈AN
[
Ri(ai, a−i)
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
π∗j (sj , aj)
]
.
We define the optimal Q-value Q∗i of SU i as the current expected reward plus its future rewards
when all SUs follow the Nash equilibrium strategies, that is,
Q∗i (si, ai) = E
[
Ri
(
si, ai,pi
∗
−i(si)
)]
+ β
∑
s′
i
Tsis′i
(
ai,pi
∗
−i(si)
)
Vi
(
s′i, π
∗
i ,pi
∗
−i
)
. (6)
Combining equations (5) and (6), it’s easy to get
Q∗i (si, ai) = E
[
Ri
(
si, ai,pi
∗
−i(si)
)]
+ β
∑
s′
i
Tsis′i
(
ai,pi
∗
−i(si)
)
max
bi∈Ai
Q∗i (s
′
i, bi).
The multi-agent Q-learning process tries to find Q∗i (si, ai) in a recursive way using the
information 〈ai, si, si, πti〉 (i = 1, · · ·, N), where si(= sti) and s′i(= st+1i ) are the states at
time slot t and t+ 1, respectively; and ai and πti are the SU i’s action taken at the end of time
slot t and the transmission strategy during time slot t. The proposed multi-agent Q-learning rule
is
Qt+1i (si, ai)
= (1− αt)Qti(si, ai) + α
t
{
Ri(si, ai, a−i)
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
πtj(sj, aj) + βmax
bi∈Ai
Qti(s
′
i, bi)
}
. (7)
where αt ∈ [0, 1) is the learning rate.
An intuitive explanation for Equation (7) is that, once the power level pi(ai) is selected, the
increasing quantity in the corresponding Q-value is updated by combining the old value and the
new expected reward. More specifically, given the probabilities {πtj(sj, aj)}Nj=1,j 6=i of the other
SUs choosing power levels {pj(aj)}Nj=1,j 6=i, if the SU i achieves higher reward Ri(ai, a−i) when
selecting power level pi(ai), then the Qti(si, ai)-value is increased by a higher value. Notice that
the proposed multi-agent Q-learning algorithm not only needs the SU i’s own information, but
the strategies of the other SUs. However, in this paper, the strategy is myopic since we assume
that there is no cooperation among the SUs.
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C. Design Objective and Challenging Issues
Our aim is to design stochastic power allocation in non-cooperative CogMesh with self-
interested SUs. The reward of each SU is a function of the joint actions of all SUs. Accordingly,
we apply the multi-agent Q-learning approach to model the interaction among the SUs’ strategy
decisions. Rather than choosing the best transmission power level, a SU in the stochastic learning
process chooses the best mixed strategy. The problem is challenging due to the fact that every
SU may not be aware of the following two things during the learning process:
1) the number of SUs coexist in the system;
2) strategies available to the other SUs.
The SU can only observe its own information, such as the environment state, the strategy, and
the received rewards.
From Equation (7), in order to learn the optimal strategy, SU i needs to know not only its
own strategy, but also the other SUs’ transmission strategies πtj(j ∈ N \ i). Along with the
discussion, we see that the obtained multi-agent Q-learning algorithm cannot solve the power
allocation problem directly because no SU can observe the competing SUs’ private information
in a non-cooperative CogMesh networking scenario. Therefore, the challenging problem arises:
how to design a stochastic non-cooperative power allocation scheme that guarantees SUs
learning the optimal strategies with only private and incomplete information?
IV. STOCHASTIC POWER ALLOCATION WITH CONJECTURE BASED MULTI-AGENT
Q-LEARNING APPROACH
As discussed in the previous section, the main disadvantage of the derived multi-agent Q-
learning algorithm is its requirement to account for the competing SUs’ strategy information. In
non-cooperative power control, however, the SUs only know what reward they are getting from
their current strategy. In this section, we propose a stochastic non-cooperative power allocation
scheme with private and incomplete information. To make the multi-agent Q-learning algorithm
sensible in non-cooperative CogMesh networking environment, it is clear that the SU needs to
conjecture the other SUs’ strategy decisions without any coordination among the local clusters
[24]. This motivates the conjecture based multi-agent Q-learning.
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A. Individual Behavior and Evolution
The goal of this paper is to design a simple non-cooperative power allocation algorithm that
requires quite limited information exchanges among the SUs. In game-theoretic point of view,
the reached NE is based on the assumptions about what knowledge the SUs possess and assumes
that every SU’s strategy will not change at the NE. Therefore, the SUs operating at the NE can
be viewed as learning agents behaving optimally with respect to their conjectures about the
strategies of the other SUs.
From Equation (7), we can see that the SU i’s current expected reward depends on both its own
decision and the other SUs’ transmission policies. However, in the non-cooperative scenario, it is
hard for the SUs to obtain the information of exact transmission strategies of their competitors.
We define cti(si, ai) =
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
πtj(sj, aj) for the SU i in time slot t, to be the conjecture represent-
ing the aggregated effect on the Qt+1i (si, ai)-value when all the other SUs choosing actions a−i ac-
cording to their corresponding strategies pit−i(si) =
(
πt1(s1), · · ·, π
t
i−1(si−1), π
t
i+1(si+1), · · ·, π
t
N(sN)
)
.
Therefore, we assume that cti(si, ai) is the only information that the SU i has about the contention
level of the entire CogMesh networking environment, because it is a metric that the SU i can
easily calculate based on local observations.
Specifically, from SU i’s viewpoint, the probability of experiencing environment state s′i is ζi =
πti(si, ai)c
t
i(si, ai). In other words, the probability that the SU i receives reward Ri(si, ai, a−i) is
ζi. Let ni denote the number of time slots between any two consecutive slot that SU i achieves the
same reward Ri(si, ai, a−i), then ni has an independent and identical distribution (i.i.d.) with ζi.
Thereupon, we have ζi ∼= 1/(1+ni), where ni is the mean value of ni and can be locally computed
by the SU i itself through the observation of its reward history. Since SU i knows its own
transmission strategy πti(si, ai), it can estimate cti(si, ai) through c˜ti(si, ai) = 1/[(1+ni)πti(si, ai)].
Note that the action available to SU i is to choose the transmission power level according
to strategy πti(si). We can express the SU i’s conjecture c˜ti(si, ai) as a function of its own
transmission strategy. A simple method is to deploy the linear model, i.e.,
c˜ti(si, ai) = ci(si, ai)− ω
si,ai
i
[
πti(si, ai)− πi(si, ai)
]
, (8)
where the so-called reference points [13], ci(si, ai) and πi(si, ai), are specific conjecture and
probability, and ωsi,aii is a positive scalar. In this paper, the reference points are considered as
exogenously given and of common knowledge. That is, SU i assumes that the other SUs will
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observe its deviation from its reference point πi(sti, ai) and the aggregate effect deviates from
the reference point ci(si, ai) by a quantity proportional to the deviation of πti(si, ai)− πi(si, ai).
Among different choices for capturing the impact of the competing SUs as a function of
its own strategy, the linear model shown in Equation (8) is the simplest form one can think
of. In the following, we will show that such simple model is sufficient for the secondary
users to achieve optimal transmissions. The critical question is how to choose the parameters
{ci(si, ai), πi(si, ai), ω
si,ai
i } to achieve the optimal strategies π∗i . We can consider setting the
parameter in Equation (8) to be:
ωsi,aii =
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
π∗j (sj, aj)
π∗i (si, ai)
.
It’s very easy to verify that, if the reference points are ci(si, ai) =
∏N
j=1,j 6=i π
∗
j (sj , aj) and
πi(si, ai) = π
∗
i (si, ai), we have c˜∗i (si, ai) =
∏N
j=1,j 6=i π
∗
j (sj, aj). Therefore, such configuration
of the conjectures c˜∗i and the strategies π∗i achieve the optimal transmission. In non-cooperative
learning scenarios, SUs learn when they modify their conjectures based on the new observations.
Specifically, we first allow the SUs to revise their reference points based on their past local
observations. We propose a simple rule for the SUs to update their reference points. In time slot
t, the SU i set ci(si, ai) and πi(si, ai) to be ct−1i (si, ai) and πt−1i (si, ai). That is, Equation (8)
becomes
c˜ti(si, ai) = c
t−1
i (si, ai)− ω
si,ai
i
[
πti(si, ai)− π
t−1
i (si, ai)
]
, (9)
for i ∈ N .
B. Conjecture based Q-value Updating
Eventually, the multi-agent Q-learning updating rule in Equation (7) is modified as following,
Qt+1i (si, ai) = (1− α
t)Qti(si, ai) + α
t
{
c˜ti(si, ai)Ri(si, ai, a−i) + βmax
bi∈Ai
Qti (s
′
i, bi)
}
. (10)
The SU i updates its Q-values only with its own information using Equation (10) during the
stochastic learning process. To avoid observing the other SUs’ private strategy information, the
SU i conjectures about how its competitors’ strategy decisions vary in response to its own
actions.
15
The purpose of stochastic power allocation is to improve performance by explicitly balancing
two competing objectives: 1) searching for better transmission power level (exploration) and
2) gathering as much reward as possible (exploitation), such that the SU not only reinforces
the evaluation of the power level it already knows to be good but also explores new one.
Though ǫ-greedy selection [7] is an efficient method of balancing exploration and exploitation
in reinforcement learning. One drawback is that it chooses equally among all available actions
when it explores. This implies that the worst action is as likely to be chosen as the best one.
An alternative solution is to vary the action probabilities as a graded function of the Q-
value. The greedy action is given the highest selection probability, but all the others are ranked
and weighted according to their Q-values. The most common method is to use a Boltzmann
distribution. The SU i chooses action ai in state si at time step t with probability [20],
πti(si, ai) =
eQ
t
i
(si,ai)/τ∑
b∈Ai
eQ
t
i
(si,b)/τ
, (11)
where τ is a positive parameter called the temperature. High temperatures cause the action prob-
abilities to be all nearly equal. Low temperatures cause big difference in selection probabilities
for actions differ in their Q-values.
Now, the steps concerning power allocation corresponding to the conjecture-based multi-agent
Q-learning algorithm are summarized as follows:
Algorithm: Conjecture based Multi-agent Q-learning Algorithm for SU i
Initialization:
Let t = 0,
For each si, ai Do
Initialize strategy πti(si, ai), Q-values Qti(si, ai), and the parameter ω
si,ai
i > 0.
End For
Evaluate the initial state si = sti.
Learning:
Loop
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(1) Choose action ai according to πti(si).
(2) Measure the SINR γi with the feedback information of the intended secondary
receiver. Construct the current environment state s′i = st+1i by identifying the
transmission power level, and comparing γi with the threshold γ∗i .
(3) If γi ≥ γ∗i , then a reward Ri(si, ai, a−i) can be achieved; otherwise, the receiver
can not receive correctly, thus obtains zero reward.
(4) Update Qt+1i (si, ai) based on c˜ti(si, ai) according to Qt+1i (si, ai) =
(1− αt)Qti(si, ai) + α
t
{
c˜ti(si, ai)Ri(si, ai, a−i) + βmax
bi∈Ai
Qti(s
′
i, bi)
}
.
(5) Update the strategy πt+1i (si, ai) = eQ
t+1
i
(si,ai)/τ
/ ∑
bi∈Ai
eQ
t+1
i
(si,bi)/τ , for all ai ∈
Ai.
(6) Update the conjecture c˜t+1i (si, ai) = cti(si, ai)−ωsi,aii
[
πt+1i (si, ai)− π
t
i(si, ai)
]
.
(7) si = st+1i .
End Loop
Next, we are interested in the convergence of this algorithm. Our proof relies on the following
lemma by Szepesvari and Littman [21], which establishes the convergence of a general Q-learning
process updated by a pseudo-contraction operator. Let Q be the space of all Q-values.
Lemma: Assume that αt in Equation (10) satisfies the sufficient conditions of Theorem in [23],
and the mapping Ht : Q→Q meets the following condition: there exists a number 0 < λ < 1
and a sequence ξt ≥ 0 converging to zero w.p. 1, such that ‖ HtQt−HtQ∗ ‖≤ λ ‖ Qt−Q∗ ‖ +ξt
for all Qt ∈Q and Q∗ = E [HtQ∗], then the iteration defined by
Qt+1 = (1− αt)Qt + αt(HtQt),
converges to Q∗ w.p. 1.
For an N-player stochastic game, we define the operator Ht as follows.
Definition 3: Let Qt = (Qt1, ···, QtN), where Qti ∈Qi for i = 1, ···, N , and Q = Q1×···×QN .
Ht : Q→ Q is a mapping on the complete metric space Q into Q, HtQt = (HtQt1, · · ·,HtQtN),
where
HtQti = c˜
t
i(si, ai)Ri(si, ai, a−i) + βmax
bi∈Ai
Qti (s
′
i, bi) .
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Then we proceed to prove that Q∗ = E[HtQ∗].
Proposition 2: For an N-player stochastic game, Q∗ = E[HtQ∗], where Q∗ = (Q∗1, · · ·, Q∗N).
Proof: Since
Q∗i (si, ai) = E
[
Ri
(
si, ai,pi
∗
−i(si)
)]
+ β
∑
s′
i
Tsis′i
(
ai,pi
∗
−i(si)
)
max
bi∈Ai
Q∗i (s
′
i, bi)
=
∑
s′
i
Tsis′i
(
ai,pi
∗
−i(si)
){ N∏
j=1,j 6=i
π∗j (sj, aj)Ri(si, ai, a−i) + βmax
bi∈Ai
Q∗i (s
′
i, bi)
}
.
From Equation (9), c˜∗i (si, ai) =
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
π∗j (sj , aj). Thus,
Q∗i (si, ai) = E
[
HtQ∗(si, ai)
]
,
for all si and ai. 
We further define the distance between two Q-values.
Definition 4: For any Q,Q′ ∈Q, we define
‖Q−Q′‖
.
= max
i
max
si
max
ai
|Qi(si, ai)−Q
′
i(si, ai)| .
Proposition 3: Ht is a contraction mapping operator.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix.
We can now present our main result in this paper that the learning process induced by
Algorithm converges.
Theorem: Regardless of any initial value chosen for Q0i (si, ai), if τ is sufficiently large,
Algorithm converges.
Proof: The proof is the direct application of Lemma, which establishes the convergence given
two conditions. First, Ht is a contraction mapping operator, by Proposition 3. Second, the fixed
point condition, Q∗ = E[HtQ∗], is ensured by Proposition 2. Therefore, the learning process
expressed by Equation (10) converges.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To demonstrate the performance of the proposed conjecture based multi-agent Q-learning
algorithm, we present simulation experiments of a hybrid CogMesh consisting of one PU network
and one CR network. Users in CogMesh are uniformly distributed over a 300m× 300m square
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area, and share the same frequency band with bandwidth of W = 1MHz. The links can
communication directly if the distance between transmitter and the corresponding receiver is
no more than 30m. The time is divided into slots, each of length 10ms. During each time slot,
each PU attempts to transmit with a probability of κ, the PU’s behavior factor. It’s supposed that
the PUs have only one transmission power level of 200mW, the AWGN power σ = 10−7mW,
and Γ = 1. Also, we set the power mask to be 200mW for all SUs. The link gains used in this
paper are given by
h = KF
(
d
d0
)−n
, for d > d0,
where K is a constant set to be 10−6, the shadowing factor F is a random number and is
independent and identically generated from a lognormal distribution with a mean of 0dB and
variance 6dB, d is the physical distance between transmitter and receiver, d0 is the reference
distance, and n is the path loss exponent. In the whole simulation process, we set d0 = 1 and
n = 4. And we here point out that all simulated curves in this paper show the average over 200
episodes.
As for the proposed conjecture based multi-agent Q-learning algorithm, it’s implemented by
each SU with a discount factor β = 0.9. And we use the following learning rate
αt =
α0
θt
,
where α0 ∈ [0, 1) is the initial learning rate, and θ > 1 is a scalar. Like any other learning
scheme, the SUs need a learning phase to learn the optimal transmission strategies under the
assumption that each SU can perfectly conjecture the probability
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
πtj(sj, aj) during each
time slot. However, once the strategies are acquired, the SUs take only one iteration to reach
the optimal energy-efficient transmission configuration, when starting at any initial environment
states si(i = 1, · · ·, N). The major concern for our proposed algorithm is the convergence speed
of the stochastic learning dynamics. We first simulate a relatively simple networking scenario
consisting of three pairs of SU links coexisting with three pairs of PU links with a behavior
factor κ = 0.5. The SUs have two transmission power levels {100mW, 200mW}. That is, in the
proposed algorithm, mi = 1 and N = {1, 2}.
Without the loss of generality, we take SU 1 for example. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the simulation
results for different α0 and τ , which indicate that the proposed algorithm converges. We can also
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see from the Fig. 3 that larger τ results in worse expected reward. This is because exploration
lasts for a longer time even if the best power level achieving optimal transmission was already
visited. Thus, during the learning process, the SU should set a sufficiently large temperature to
balance the tradeoff between exploration and exploitation or has to dynamically adjust it. The
curves in Fig. 4 illustrate that when τ is small, for smaller α0 the convergence performance is
worse. Since the Q-values converges slowly, then still exploration phases dominates the learning
procedure, which may lead to decreasing the opportunities of achieving optimal transmission
configuration on average. Overall, the performance of our proposed algorithm is good when
choosing a suitable learning rate α0. If the algorithm is deployed by the SUs in CogMesh
environment, α0 has to be chosen in advance.
Next, for a more general case, we consider that the CR network consists of six SUs co-locating
with five PUs. The PUs attempt to transmit with a probability κ = 1. Each SU has multiple
transmission power levels. The discrete transmission power levels the SUs used are in the range
from 100mW to 200mW equally spaced by 20mW. We compare the expected rewards of SUs
achieved by the proposed algorithm with the system’s optimum Ropti = maxp Ri(p) in Fig. 5.
It can be seen from the graph that the achieved performance is close to the optimum and the
performance loss is no more than 25% on the average.
Fig. 6 depicts the expected rewards of the six secondary users versus the PU’s behavior factor
κ under the same networking environment assumptions as in Fig. 5. As expected, a higher
κ results in higher interference caused by the PUs to the SUs, i.e., the expected rewards are
degraded.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the non-cooperative power allocation problem specifically
in CogMesh which is modeled as a stochastic learning process. We extend the single-agent
Q-learning algorithm to a multi-user context. Due to the non-cooperation among the local
clusters, a conjecture based multi-agent Q-learning approach is proposed to reach the optimal
transmission strategies with only private and incomplete information. The learning SU performs
Q-function updating based on the conjecture about other SUs’ behaviors over the current Q-
values. This learning algorithm provably converges given certain restrictions that arise during
learning procedure, and the simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the algorithm to improve
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energy efficiency. The results in this paper provide us with a new approach to design the protocols
for the non-cooperative CR networks.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof: ∥∥HtQ−HtQ′∥∥
= max
i
max
si
max
ai
∣∣HtQi(si, ai)−HtQ′i(si, ai)∣∣
= max
i
max
si
max
ai
∣∣∣ [c˜i(si, ai)− c˜′i(si, ai)]Ri(si, ai, a−i)+
β
[
max
bi∈Ai
Qi (s
′
i, bi)− max
bi∈Ai
Q′i (s
′
i, bi)
] ∣∣∣
≤ max
i
max
si
max
ai
∣∣∣ [c˜i(si, ai)− c˜′i(si, ai)]Ri(si, ai, a−i)∣∣∣+
max
i
max
si
β
∣∣∣max
bi∈Ai
Qi (s
′
i, bi)− max
bi∈Ai
Q′i (s
′
i, bi)
∣∣∣
≤ max
i
max
si
max
ai
|[c˜i(si, ai)− c˜
′
i(si, ai)]Ri(si, ai, a−i)|+ β ‖Q−Q
′‖ .
We discuss the first item [c˜i(si, ai)− c˜′i(si, ai)]Ri(si, ai, a−i) in the last inequality above. Due
to the fact that the reference points are exogenously given and of common knowledge, then we
have
[c˜i(si, ai)− c˜
′
i(si, ai)]Ri(si, ai, a−i) = −ω
si,ai
i [πi(si, ai)− π
′
i(si, ai)]Ri(si, ai, a−i) (A-1)
We first concentrate on the item πi(si, ai) in Equation (A-1). By applying Equation (11), we
have
πi(si, ai) =
eQi(si,ai)/τ∑
b∈Ai
eQi(si,b)/τ
.
When τ is sufficiently large, we get
eQi(si,ai)/τ = 1 +
Qi(si, ai)
τ
+ ϑ
(
Qi(si, ai)
τ
)
,
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where ϑ
(
Qi(si,ai)
τ
)
is a polynomial of order O
((
Qi(si,ai)
τ
)2)
. It’s very easy to verify that
πi(si, ai) =
1
mi + 1
+
Qi(si, ai)
(mi + 1)τ
+ ̺ ({Qi(si, b)}b) , (A-2)
where ̺ ({Qi(si, b)}b) is the polynomial of smaller order than O
(
Qi(si,ai)
τ
)
. Note that the
coefficient of the polynomial is independent of the Q-value. Similarly,
π′i(si, ai) =
1
mi + 1
+
Q′i(si, ai)
(mi + 1)τ
+ ̺ ({Q′i(si, b)}b) . (A-3)
Substituting Equations (A-2) and (A-3) to Equation (A-1) establishes
[c˜i(si, ai)− c˜
′
i(si, ai)]Ri(si, ai, a−i)
= −ωsi,aii Ri(si, ai, a−i)
[
Qi(si, ai)
(mi + 1)τ
−
Q′i(si, ai)
(mi + 1)τ
+ ̺ ({Qi(si, b)}b)− ̺ ({Q
′
i(si, b)}b)
]
= −Ci(si, ai)
{
1
mi + 1
[
Qi(si, ai)
τ
−
Q′i(si, ai)
τ
]
+ ̺ ({Qi(si, b)}b)− ̺ ({Q
′
i(si, b)}b)
}
.
That is, we can always take a sufficiently large τ such that
|[c˜i(si, ai)− c˜
′
i(si, ai)]Ri(si, ai, a−i)| ≤
1−miβ
mi + 1
|[Qi(si, ai)−Q
′
i(si, ai)]| ,
which implies∥∥HtQ−HtQ′∥∥ ≤ max
i
max
si
max
ai
β
mi + 1
|[Qi(si, ai)−Q
′
i(si, ai)]|+ β ‖Q−Q
′‖
=
1 + β
mi + 1
‖Q−Q′‖ .
Therefore, Ht is a contraction mapping operator. This concludes the proof. 
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Fig. 2. Cognitive wireless mesh networking (CogMesh) scenarios.
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Fig. 3. Performance, when κ = 0.5: Impact of the temperature τ to expected rewards achieved by SU 1.
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Fig. 4. Performance, when κ = 0.5: Impact of the learning rate α0 to expected rewards achieved by SU 1.
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